June 2025
The Darkest Times of Runet
A Review of Internet Censorship in Russia in 2024
In 2024, Russia experienced an unprecedented level of digital censorship. In addition to the ongoing blocking of internet resources and pages since 2012, a system of technical measures to counter threats, TSPU, helped throttle and block global services such as YouTube, Discord, and Viber, as well as technologies like ECH and DNS. The authorities introduced a new law banning the "popularization" of methods for circumventing blocks. This led to the gradual disappearance of information about these methods from the public domain. At the request of Russian authorities, VPNs and independent media applications were removed from the App Store. Censors regularly conduct tests during which Russian users experience difficulties accessing half of the websites on the internet, indicating a possible rollout of "whitelists." According to this approach, users are allowed access only to pre-approved websites, while everything else is blocked by default.
In 2025, the situation only worsens: the censorship practices established in 2024 continue to evolve, becoming more resilient and sophisticated. People in Russia are finding it even harder to access independent information and a free internet.
Russia is entering a new era characterized by the government’s complete control over the domestic internet through a system of technical measures to counter threats, TSPU. Avoiding blacklists, TSPU blocks individual internet resources, hosting providers, VPN protocols, and other technological solutions that are not controlled by the authorities and are used by individuals and organizations to securely access the global internet. The system can also slow down or completely shut down internet traffic in certain regions for reasons of national security.
Censors regularly conduct tests during which Russian users experience difficulties accessing half of the websites on the internet, indicating a possible rollout of "whitelists." According to this approach, users are allowed access only to pre-approved websites, while everything else is blocked by default.
At the same time, the system operates in an extremely opaque, unpredictable, and arbitrary manner. The increasingly complex and pervasive blocking and throttling of various resources and protocols negatively impacts network connectivity, causing sudden shutdowns, disruptions, and malfunctions of many resources. Moreover, along with the resources deliberately targeted by censors, completely unrelated websites are also blocked.
Censors are not only blocking access to information, they are also trying to eliminate any easy ways to bypass these blocks. A war has been declared on VPNs and other anti-censorship tools whose explosive growth undoubtedly disturbed Roskomnadzor. Throughout 2024, Russia blocked VPN protocols, causing those used by mass commercial VPNs to stop working. The ultimate goal is to make using VPN technology practically impossible without official approval from the authorities. This is the path to "whitelists", following the Iranian scenario.
At the same time, we are witnessing the initial implementation of "graylists" in Russia, indicating a higher level of censorship. According to "graylists", content not only officially included in "blacklists" is censored, but also anything deemed suspicious or unclear. Blockings are implemented based on in-depth traffic analysis using DPI and the identification of "suspicious" IP addresses. A closer example is China, where there are no "whitelists" and restrictions are based on "blacklists" and "graylists".
This report summarizes the most significant events and trends in internet censorship in Russia in 2024. In addition to the mentioned blockages and throttling of resources, services, and VPN protocols, it covers other censorship methods: Active Probing, ECH and DNS blocking, censorship of hosting providers, website mirrors, and CDNs, provider outages, and testing of the sovereign Runet through the TSPU. The report concludes with a description of possible future scenarios and insights.
Russia is entering a new era characterized by the government’s complete control over the domestic internet through a system of technical measures to counter threats, TSPU. Avoiding blacklists, TSPU blocks individual internet resources, hosting providers, VPN protocols, and other technological solutions that are not controlled by the authorities and are used by individuals and organizations to securely access the global internet. The system can also slow down or completely shut down internet traffic in certain regions for reasons of national security.
Censors regularly conduct tests during which Russian users experience difficulties accessing half of the websites on the internet, indicating a possible rollout of "whitelists." According to this approach, users are allowed access only to pre-approved websites, while everything else is blocked by default.
At the same time, the system operates in an extremely opaque, unpredictable, and arbitrary manner. The increasingly complex and pervasive blocking and throttling of various resources and protocols negatively impacts network connectivity, causing sudden shutdowns, disruptions, and malfunctions of many resources. Moreover, along with the resources deliberately targeted by censors, completely unrelated websites are also blocked.
Censors are not only blocking access to information, they are also trying to eliminate any easy ways to bypass these blocks. A war has been declared on VPNs and other anti-censorship tools whose explosive growth undoubtedly disturbed Roskomnadzor. Throughout 2024, Russia blocked VPN protocols, causing those used by mass commercial VPNs to stop working. The ultimate goal is to make using VPN technology practically impossible without official approval from the authorities. This is the path to "whitelists", following the Iranian scenario.
At the same time, we are witnessing the initial implementation of "graylists" in Russia, indicating a higher level of censorship. According to "graylists", content not only officially included in "blacklists" is censored, but also anything deemed suspicious or unclear. Blockings are implemented based on in-depth traffic analysis using DPI and the identification of "suspicious" IP addresses. A closer example is China, where there are no "whitelists" and restrictions are based on "blacklists" and "graylists".
This report summarizes the most significant events and trends in internet censorship in Russia in 2024. In addition to the mentioned blockages and throttling of resources, services, and VPN protocols, it covers other censorship methods: Active Probing, ECH and DNS blocking, censorship of hosting providers, website mirrors, and CDNs, provider outages, and testing of the sovereign Runet through the TSPU. The report concludes with a description of possible future scenarios and insights.
In addition to data from experts and reports from active Runet users, the review includes information from the DPIDetector project. This information was collected with the help of volunteer node holders who tested VPN protocol blockages.
This report would not have been possible without the contributions of our colleagues at Roskomsvoboda, Tech Talk, ZaTelecom, NTC.party, Great Fire, OONI, VPN Guild, and Amnezia VPN. We are deeply grateful for their commitment and efforts.
This report would not have been possible without the contributions of our colleagues at Roskomsvoboda, Tech Talk, ZaTelecom, NTC.party, Great Fire, OONI, VPN Guild, and Amnezia VPN. We are deeply grateful for their commitment and efforts.