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10 December 2024

documenting pressure on independent media

Chronicles
of censorship

The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), in partnership with RKS Global, has released a report that documents the intensification of censorship in Russia over the past year.
The study examines the blocking of independent Russian news websites over the past year and its impact on media organizations. Using a mixed-methods approach, researchers combined quantitative analysis of OONI data with qualitative methods, including interviews with 15 media representatives, open-source research, and updates to the Citizen Lab censorship test list.
Between September 2023 and September 2024, OONI confirmed the blocking of 279 news media domains—twice as many as the previous year.
The report details at least 279 cases of blocked media and independent projects. It also documents the blocking of Russian media in the European Union and the retaliatory blocking of at least 81 European media resources in Russia. The researchers note that censorship in Russia has become more effective through the employment of TLS interference, which makes it more difficult for users to bypass censorship.
OONI's analysis of Web Connectivity test measurements identifies cases of blocking, their implementation methods, and differences in censorship techniques across providers.
The results show that website blocking in Russia uses a variety of techniques, including DNS, TCP/IP, and TLS handshake interference.
Compared to previous years, most providers now block media domains at the TLS level. This requires DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) technologies, suggesting that censorship is increasingly centralized and efficient.

2024: A year of challenges for independent media

In 2024, Russian independent media faced escalating censorship, widespread blocking, fines, and designations as "foreign agents" and "undesirable organizations," putting significant pressure on journalists and editorial teams. Despite these challenges, many outlets continue to operate and adapt to new realities. While website blockages have complicated access for Russian users, a significant portion of the audience (up to 50%) remains in Russia, effectively using VPNs, mirrors, and social media platforms like Telegram.

However, 2024 has also been a challenging year for VPNs due to several factors:

  • Promotion, advertising, and instructional use of VPNs, even for academic purposes, have been outlawed in Russia.
  • Russian censors have developed the ability to block VPN protocols, including OpenVPN and Shadowsocks (originally designed for China).
  • Many foreign VPNs have become unavailable due to VISA/Mastercard issues and their voluntary withdrawal from the Russian market due to sanctions.
  • Apple has assisted censorship efforts by removing 409 VPN applications from the Russian App Store at the request of Russian authorities.
One reliable VPN solution in Russia is the AmneziaWG protocol by Amnezia VPN, a modern version of the popular WireGuard protocol. It is protected against detection by DPI systems, while retaining the simplicity and high performance of the original. The VLESS protocol has also proven effective, even during the "Sovereign Internet" tests in Russia's North Caucasus republics.

BigTech in online censorship

A significant concern in 2024 is Apple’s collaboration with Russian authorities in implementing online censorship. In addition to removing VPN applications that bypass censorship, Apple has also removed mobile apps of independent media outlets. Apps from the Russian services of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s, including Sibir.Realii and Sever.Realii, have been removed from the Russian App Store. Apps from the BBC, Meduza, TV Rain, and other independent media are also at risk.
Apple claims to comply with local laws worldwide, but its cooperation with Russian censors represents a unique case of Big Tech collaborating with an authoritarian government to systematically violate human rights. Unlike countries like Myanmar, China, or Iran, Russia has a vast base of iPhone users, with Apple devices comprising about 40% of the mobile market. Despite Apple’s official withdrawal from Russia and declining retail sales, the number of iPhones in use continues to grow, amplifying the company’s social impact and the consequences of its collaboration with the authorities.

Challenges and recommendations

Key challenges for the media include financial instability, staffing difficulties, and security risks.
Repressive designations limit opportunities for collaboration and promotion, increasing self-censorship and reducing the number of independent projects. Meanwhile, social media has become the primary channel for audience engagement, with subscriber growth driven by high-impact events, highlighting the continued demand for content despite blockages. However, the safety and reliability of platforms such as Telegram remain a concern due to their opaque operations and lack of communication with media representatives.
The report emphasizes the need for international support to protect press freedom in Russia. This includes changes in tech companies’ content moderation policies, resource assistance for independent media, and the development of tools such as OONI Probe to monitor and document internet censorship.
Freedom of the press remains a cornerstone of democracy and civil liberties. The findings shed light on the scale and mechanisms of censorship and their implications for independent journalism in Russia.

Strategies for ensuring access to information

The need for solidarity

A key focus for digital rights advocates is to communicate to content creators in related sectors that we are all in this together. If content distribution to Russian audiences becomes impossible, all stakeholders will lose their audiences. Support from IT professionals for civil society is also critical, although practical support remains limited as the legal framework for defending access to information continues to shrink.

Promoting tools to circumvent censorship

Installing a VPN requires a certain level of technical knowledge, and it is crucial to make this information accessible. Efforts should focus on collecting and updating data on the current functionality of VPNs, including available obfuscation protocols and those still available for purchase and operational in Russia.

Shifting marketing focus

VPN technology’s ability to bypass censorship is a secondary effect; its primary purpose is to provide secure connections that protect personal data and communications. Emphasizing this can attract a broader audience, including those who are not interested in bypassing censorship, but who prioritize privacy and security. This audience represents an untapped growth potential for VPN services.

Avoiding provocative headlines

Websites with VPN-related instructions are not only blocked in Russia but they are also heavily penalized in search rankings, disappearing from the information landscape entirely. To ensure that outreach efforts are not undermined, materials promoting VPNs should avoid provocative language that could lead to blocking.

Using email newsletters

Email newsletters remain a resilient way to stay connected with audiences and are difficult for authorities to suppress. While still emerging in Russia, this model has been long used and proven effective in countries like China.

Technical support and development of circumvention tools

Investing in tools that provide access to content without relying on VPNs is essential, as is improving traffic obfuscation technologies to enhance user security.

Optimizing communication channels

Adapting content for platforms such as Telegram and Instagram with a focus on concise and accessible formats can maximize audience reach.

Strengthening financial foundations

Exploring alternative platforms for fundraising, partnership projects, and grants will be essential for the sustainable development of independent media.

Recommendations

For independent media:

  • Conduct regular audits of account and device security, use encrypted communication channels, and train staff and audiences in digital literacy to protect against data breaches.

  • Move to secure international platforms for publishing content, minimizing reliance on Russian resources.

  • Provide legal support to journalists and editors, particularly around labeling and "fake news" laws, and collaborate with human rights organizations and international media to highlight censorship issues.

  • Develop financial models based on crowdfunding, fundraising, and cryptocurrency donations to reduce dependence on local funding. Expand international audiences to mitigate the risks of Russian blocking.

  • Create and distribute safe-use guidelines for censorship circumvention tools in collaboration with cybersecurity experts.

  • Optimize content for high engagement platforms, focusing on short and visual materials.

For civil society and the IT sector:

  • Provide information support to independent media and initiatives aimed at the legal and moral defense of journalists. Launch public campaigns advocating for freedom of speech, including raising funds to support journalists.

  • Strengthen efforts to develop and distribute censorship circumvention tools such as VPNs, website mirrors, and encrypted platforms. Improve traffic obfuscation technologies and develop new censorship-resistant protocols.

  • Increase international pressure on Russian authorities for violations of freedom of speech and raise global awareness of censorship and blocking issues in Russia.

  • Continue to research and document cases of censorship to mobilize international attention.

  • Foster partnerships between media, IT professionals, and civil society to create effective and sustainable solutions.

For BigTech companies:

  • Adjust corporate policies on compliance with government requirements in authoritarian regimes when such demands conflict with international legal norms.

  • Develop algorithms and tools to increase the visibility of independent sources of information in countries with severe restrictions.
  • Introduce built-in VPN tools in applications to help users bypass government censorship.

  • Actively protect the accounts of journalists and independent outlets from cyber attacks and blocking.

  • Establish a dialogue with media representatives and provide responsive support.

For independent media consumers:

  • Raise awareness of available censorship circumvention technologies, such as VPNs and proxy services, to maintain access to independent media.

  • Support independent media through crowdfunding and share verified information through social networks and digital platforms.

  • Promote media literacy to critically evaluate information and guard against disinformation and manipulation in times of crisis.
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